Crime, media and the will-to-representation: Reconsidering relationships in the new media age

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Abstract
This paper considers the ways in which the rise of new media might challenge commonplace criminological assumptions about the crime–media interface. Established debates around crime and media have long been based upon a fairly clear demarcation between production and consumption, between object and audience – the media generates and transmits representations of crime, and audiences engage with them. However, one of the most noticeable changes occurring in the wake of the development of new media is the proliferation of self-organised production by ‘ordinary people’ – everything ranging from self-authored web pages and ‘blogs’, to self-produced video created using hand-held camcorders, camera-phones and ‘webcams’. Today we see the spectacle of people performing acts of crime and deviance in order to record them, send them and upload them to the Internet. This kind of ‘will to representation’ may be seen in itself as a new kind of causal inducement to law- and rule-breaking behaviour. It may be that, in the new media age, the terms of criminological questioning need to be sometimes reversed: instead of asking whether ‘media’ instigates crime or fear of crime, we must ask how the very possibility of mediating oneself to an audience through self-representation might be bound up with the genesis of criminal behaviour.

Keywords
demotic production, digital culture, mediation, new media, self-representation

This paper considers the ways in which the rise of new media might challenge commonplace criminological assumptions about the crime–media interface. Established debates around crime and media have long been based upon a fairly clear demarcation between production and consumption, and between object and audience – the media generates and transmits representations of crime, and audiences engage with them (with varying potential consequences, such as the inculcation of dominant ideologies or the shaping of attitudes and behaviour). At best, the
audience might be seen as a co-producer of meaning in the sense that it has the capacity to inflect and shape meaning through the act of reading or interpretation. However, one of the most noticeable changes occurring in the wake of the development of new media is the proliferation of self-organised production by ‘ordinary people’ – everything ranging from self-authored web pages and ‘blogs’, to self-produced video created using hand-held camcorders, camera-phones and ‘webcams’. Today we see the spectacle of (predominantly) young people performing acts of crime and deviance in order to record them, share them and upload them to the Internet. This kind of ‘will to communicate’ or ‘will to representation’1 may be seen in itself as a new kind of causal inducement to law- and rule-breaking behaviour. It may be that, in the new media age, the terms of criminological questioning need to be sometimes reversed: instead of asking whether ‘media’ instigates crime or fear of crime, we must ask how the very possibility of mediating oneself to an audience through self-representation might be bound up with the genesis of criminal behaviour.

Criminology and the Media–Society Nexus in the Modern Age

Criminology’s engagement with mediated representation is conditioned, in the first instance, by a broader framing of the issues that has held sway across the human and social sciences. This framing is derived from an analysis of the historical emergence and development of the ‘mass media’ within modern societies, and is located within the wider dynamics of modernization processes (Thompson, 1995). In this account, the production and circulation of cultural discourse becomes incrementally monopolised by an organised institutional sphere, whose emergence from the 18th century onwards was driven by a combination of technological, economic and political factors (Gorman and McLean, 2009; Briggs and Burke, 2010: 5). The totality of symbolic codifications (or the production of cosmology, as anthropologists would put it) are thus formally and rationally managed, engineered according to a model of mass industrial production, and lie primarily in the hands of a specific class of professional media producers (a class that itself emerges as part of a more generalised dynamic of role differentiation and functional specialisation in modern societies; Durkheim, 1997). This version of media history underpins what have come to be accepted as seminal studies of mass culture and mass communication. These range from the conservative ‘mass culture’ narratives associated with the likes of Ortega y Gasset (1994 [1932]) and Dwight Macdonald (1953); through the neo-Marxist critique of the ‘culture industries’ and the ‘ideology of advanced capitalism’ associated with Frankfurt School thinkers such as Adorno (1991) and Marcuse (1964); to those accounts that locate within the modern mass media the imperatives that form modern political collectivities (Anderson, 1983) and the bourgeois civic sphere associated with them (Habermas, 1992). Despite their otherwise significant differences, such accounts are commonly predicated upon the kind of historical-structural account noted above, and as a consequence share a common social ontology and associated explanatory commitment in positing relations of causality between ‘media’ and ‘society’. These grounding assumptions will be expanded upon below, along with a consideration of how they have shaped criminological discourse.

The first assumption that we must note relates to an ontological distinction between ‘media’ on the one hand and ‘society’ or other institutional spheres on the other. As noted above, such a
distinction is predicated upon a (broadly functionalist) sociological analysis that understands modern societies as configured by processes of incremental differentiation. Society becomes, in effect, a set of distinct and ontologically self-subsistent systems, each of which is ordered according to its own logic or institutionalised norms (Parsons, 1991 [1951]). Consequently, the formulation of research questions or hypotheses becomes organised by an attempt to trace the interactions between ‘media’ and other societal spheres, including most especially questions of ‘impact’ (i.e. how does ‘media’ interact with, or shape, other social domains such as ‘politics’, ‘law’, ‘economy’, ‘family’, and so on; Luhmann, 2000). Situated social actors, located in any or all of the aforementioned social spheres, encounter communications mediated into their lives from ‘outside’, from the media system whose primary purpose is the organised generation and dissemination of cultural meanings. The logical corollaries of this ontology are the empirical and analytical categories that social science habitually uses in examining media–society interactions – those key distinctions between **writers** and **readers**, **speakers** and **listeners**, **performers** and **audiences**, and **producers** and **consumers**. Put most succinctly, media produce and circulate meanings (representations, codes, narratives, images) and audiences, located elsewhere, variously receive and interpret them, with consequences for how social actors construct the reality in which they live.

In keeping with the ontological and analytical presuppositions identified above, the criminological engagement with media developed with a primary focus upon identifying, understanding and assessing how mediated representations shape variously the criminological subject’s behaviour, dispositions and ‘world views’. Most directly, of course, this pursuit of causal impacts of media upon society has taken the form of ‘effects’ studies that seek to identify the ways in which ‘exposure’ to representations of crime affect the behaviour dispositions of audiences (for a small, but representative, sample of such work see Bandura, Ross, and Ross, 1961; Huesmann and Eron, 1986; Bushman and Anderson, 2002). Such studies have fallen out of favour following criticisms, from media scholars broadly as well as from criminologists, concerning variously their psychological reductionism, methodological inadequacy and the denial of agency to social subjects (Gauntlett, 1998; Doyle, 2006). Consequently, criminological studies of the media have shifted to consider a broader set of socio-cultural questions, examining variously the ways in which mediated representations and narratives about crime, criminality and victimisation shape social understandings and political and policy responses (Brown, 2011). These discursive framings of crime-related issues may be conceptualised as ‘ideologies’, ‘imaginaries’, ‘rhetorics’, ‘cognitive frameworks’ and so on (Yar, 2010). The criminological subject of such inquiries is no longer the actual or potential offender, whose behavioural dispositions have been moulded by the impact of mediated incitements to rule-breaking and violence. Rather, this subject is examined as a citizen or member of the public whose understandings of what constitutes ‘the problem of crime’, criminality, risk and danger are shaped by the conventionalised encodings of factual and fictional media representation; and the consequences of such mediations are analysed in terms of social subjects’ concerns and fears about particular crimes, about particular ‘others’ who supposedly threaten predation, and in terms of public support for particular political and criminal justice policies, such as the turn to ‘punitiveness’ or demands for remedial action to restore ‘law and order’ that is viewed as being under threat (see, for example, Cohen, 1972; Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke and Roberts, 1978; Sparks, 1992; Garland, 2001; Mason, 2003; Greer, 2003; Rafter, 2006).

The reorientation of criminological inquiry, away from ‘effects’ and towards a wider socially, politically and economically situated analysis of representations, comprises a major step forward
in the discipline’s engagements with media. Yet the crucial question in the current context is the extent to which such studies, despite their sophistication, nevertheless continue to operate within the dualistic ontology that separates the producers of representations from their recipients, audiences or interpreters. Granted, major lessons have been learned from hermeneutic theory, semiotics and the associated development of reception and audience studies. The audience is no longer to be conceptualised as the passive internaliser of pre-fixed meanings (the so-called ‘transmission model’; Shannon and Weaver, 1949), but is rather granted a degree of agency in interpreting and thus ‘co-creating’ the meaning of representations (Hall, 1973; Morley, 1980; Fiske, 1989). This more nuanced understanding has been elaborated by Du Gay et al.’s (1997) ‘circuits of culture’ model, and also by Abercrombie and Longhurst (1998) in their analysis of media ‘spectacle/performance’. This emphasis on creative interpretation of mediated representations has received a further impetus from the resurgence of interpretivism in criminology, championed by cultural criminology (Ferrell, 1995; Ferrell, Hayward and Young, 2008). As Ferrell (1999: 396–397) puts it, an integral element of cultural criminology is the exploration of ‘the mass media’s role in constructing the reality of crime and deviance, and in generating new forms of social and legal control’. Cultural criminology has, given its commitment to the ethnographic study of subcultural meaning (see Ferrell, 1993, 2001; Lyng, 2005), attended to subjects’ situated sense-making and construction of shared cultural codes. Yet, I would suggest, even such endeavours ultimately work within the dualistic distinction between those who generate media representation, and those who interpret them – however creatively audiences/readers/viewers do so, they are usually conceptualised as the recipients of discourses produced by others in the ‘mediasphere’ (Hartley, 1996) of institutionalised and professional production (film, television, press reportage and so on). I am not suggesting here (in line with a common post-structuralist critique of ‘modernist’ thought; Derrida 1997) that the recourse to ontological and analytical dualisms is inherently problematic. Indeed, insofar as the primary encodings of mediated meanings continue to be produced by the culture industries, and disseminated thence into the wider societal milieus, the distinction between production and consumption (and between writers and readers, utterance and interpretation) is entirely warranted. However, I wish to argue here that this framework becomes counter-productive when dealing with new media forms in which social subjects are significantly reconstituted as the primary producers of self-generated mediated representations. In such a scenario, the criminological subject no longer interprets or attends to representations produced elsewhere, but becomes her- or himself the source of those representations. Under such circumstances, as I shall detail below, the subject’s place within the crime–media relationship may be transformed in ways that are consequential and important for criminological research.

The Subject of New Media

The claim that the emergence of ‘new media’ is criminologically consequential requires us to reflect upon just what is distinctive about recent developments in media technologies and practices. At one level, talk of ‘old’ or ‘new’ media is simply a matter of chronological convenience – all media are literally ‘new’ when they first emerge, and become ‘old’ or normalised as they mature and are socially institutionalised. However, recent accounts have claimed that those media technologies which have come to prominence over the past few decades possess social-structural features that distinguish them from the dominant mass media forms of the preceding century.
The mass media consolidated during the 19th and 20th centuries (print, phonographs, radio, film and television) share some significant structural features that organise users’ engagements with them in specific ways. First, they are characterised by a ‘few-to-many’ model of communication – a small number of media producers disseminate discourses to a mass audience, such that there are few ‘speakers’ and many more ‘listeners’. Second, these mass media are organised into ‘one-way’ channels – communication flows unidirectionally from producers to consumers, but seldom in the other direction (Thompson, 1995: 16–18; also McQuail, 2010). This few-to-many and one-way structure effectively limits and constrains societal interaction with mediated communication, such that the mass of people are the recipients of communication but not the makers of communication. This is precisely why criminology, alongside other social sciences, has conceptualised its subjects as impacted, shaped, or influenced by media messages which they themselves do not produce. Even where the cultural dynamics of visibility and spectacle have been noted as significant features of contemporary mediascapes, and their criminological consequences noted, these have tended to be construed in terms of top-down and unidirectional communication from powerful producers towards a wider viewing public (see, for example, Mathiesen’s (1997) otherwise excellent account of ‘synoptic’ power and the dynamics of the ‘viewer society’). However, as I shall suggest below, newer media forms have distinctive and different social-structural properties that require a new conceptual and analytical vocabulary if we are to effectively examine the ways in which they are implicated in crime and deviance.²

The term ‘new media’ is used to designate a number of information communication technologies (ICTs) that utilise computerisation in the generation, reproduction and transmission of digitised content (Jenkins, 2008). Technologies such as digital audio-visual recording, image manipulation, computer-generated animation and ‘desktop publishing’ effectively make media production capacities widely available at low (and falling) cost – the basis of what Turner (2009) calls the ‘demotic turn’ in media production. Such ‘DIY’ media production, located outside major media industries, has of course long existed – ranging from cottage industries of self-publishing, through pamphleteering, to pirate radio, fanzines, bootlegging and amateur film-making. However, such production has historically been limited and constrained by two factors: first, the prohibitive barriers to entry set by the cost of technologies required for high-quality production (alongside the specialised knowledge and skills needed to utilise them), and second, the highly localised space of dissemination through interpersonal and community networks. Both of these limiting conditions on demotic production can be transcended with the emergence of new media – the former due the aforementioned availability of easy-to-use, low-cost media technologies, the latter due to new socio-technological means for media distribution. Central to the second development is the interconnection and integration of such technologies within electronic communication networks such as the Internet and World Wide Web. The consequence is that samizdat media production has access to global networks of communication and distribution such as the Internet, which effectively slip the constraints of space and time (Castells, 1996, 1997). Taken together, these shifts necessitate a reconceptualisation of the erstwhile distinction between producers and consumers. This reframing has been captured in media analysis by recourse to concepts such as the ‘prosumer’ (Tapscott, 2008; Ritzer and Jurgenson, 2010) and ‘peer producer’ (Bauwens, 2006). Most relevant for the present discussion is the way in which distributed participation has enabled a proliferation of user-generated content – media content produced by everyday users of new digital technologies, and distributed or shared through networked communication channels.
From early platforms such as text-based electronic bulletin boards and discussion lists, through to the more recent iterations of social media platforms (associated with so-called Web 2.0), the Internet has featured DIY media content produced by ‘ordinary users’, and capable of global dissemination (Rettburg, 2008; Burgess and Green, 2009; Gauntlett, 2011). User-generated representations (audio-visual recordings, still images and text) can garner large audiences as they are promoted ‘virally’ through hyperlinking and the rapid spread of electronic word-of-mouth (or, perhaps, we should say word-of-mouse). The upshot is that, more than ever before, everyday social actors can now (for better or worse) mediate themselves or engage in self-presentation via electronic channels, rather than simply consuming mediated representations produced by organised culture industries.3

Before moving on to consider the specific criminological implications of these aforementioned developments, further consideration is needed of the nature and context of mediated self-presentation. The discussion thus far may give the (erroneous) impression that the rise of such demotic mediation practices is simply driven by the emergence of a technology that makes it possible. In other words, socio-cultural practices of (self)-representation can be explained by recourse to a technologically determinist account of social change (Heilbroner, 1994; Jordan, 2008). On the contrary, I would argue that self-representation via mediated communication partakes of a long-standing existential-ontological impetus that emerges with modernity as a social formation. As Blumenberg (1985) explores, the idea of the ‘modern age’ is centred around a new conception of subjective ‘self-assertion’ in which the individual is both liberated and required to create herself anew, without reference to pre-existing metaphysical anchors. This self-creating subjectivity comes to the fore from the 18th century onwards with the rise of Romanticism as a doctrine focused upon the creation of an ‘authentic’ self (Eagleton, 1990; Taylor, 1992). The self is no longer ‘given’, but is rather the product of imagination allied to the exercise of the will, a process through which each individual can create her- or himself anew. Crucially, this Romantic self articulates and expresses its authenticity through cultural communication and artistic representation – the creation of the self and its aesthetic performance go hand-in-hand. This aestheticized performance, in which the individual creates and publicly displays his uniqueness, led not only to bohemian self-expressive movements in art and literature, but also to phenomena such as ‘dandy-ism’, in which the human body itself becomes the object and vehicle of creative self-making (Wilson, 2009; Baudelaire, 2010). The rise of this self-creating subjectivity has been analysed sociologically, of course, by the likes of Giddens (1991) in the context of a ‘de-traditionalisation’ process which places ever greater burden upon individuals to create themselves through the exercise of reflexive choices about identity and lifestyle. Through the course of the 20th century (and into the 21st), media have played an increasingly significant role as the channels through which the supposedly unique and highly differentiated self is asserted and displayed, the conduit through which the self seeks social recognition. This is apparent in the rise of stardom and celebrity culture, which amount to a mass-mediated play of self-presentation and provide the basis upon which social esteem is increasingly allocated (Marshall, 1997; Turner, 2006). It would not be overly dramatic to suggest that, in the present configuration of mediatised society, ‘to be’ is ‘to be seen’ – one exists as a socially recognisable (and noteworthy) subject insofar as one is available and visible to others through mediated representation. This imperative effectively generates a widespread will-to-representation, as everyday individuals are induced, seduced and culturally propelled to assert their selfhood and seek social recognition (‘to be somebody’) through mediated representation.
The Criminological Subject and the Will-to-Representation: Offending and Self-Mediation

The argument being developed here is that the will-to-representation (the imperative to represent the self via electronic mediation) is criminologically significant, in that it can intersect with the enactment of offending behaviour. This is not to suggest that such an intersection is the only criminologically consequential feature of new media and communication technologies; indeed, the burgeoning field of cybercrime studies is devoted in considerable part to exploring the manifold ways in which new media technologies both enable new forms of offending and transform existing patterns of crime and deviance (Yar, 2006; Wall, 2007). However, the technologically extended capacity for mediated self-presentation is one feature of the new media environment that has been heretofore overlooked in criminological discussion, and as such warrants sustained examination. As noted in the preceding discussion, the articulation of identity via the media has come to be associated with making claims to social esteem or recognition, such that representations of individuals are used to claim social acknowledgement on the basis of their supposedly unique characteristics and noteworthy achievements (Braudy, 1997). However, we must also acknowledge that such claims for attention and recognition can be organised around breaches of agreed social norms and values as well as around conformity or excellence in the enactment of such norms and values. In other words, ‘infamy’ as well as ‘fame’, and ‘vice’ as well as ‘virtue’, can and do function as the basis upon which mediated claims to social recognition are articulated. In this dynamic, dramatic deviation from agreed social norms (including the breach of those prohibitions set down in law) serve as the basis of claims for esteem and recognition. Penfold-Mounce (2009) explores the phenomenon of what she calls ‘celebrated criminality’, in which mass media have come to exploit criminality so as to sell to a fascinated public the spectacle of transgression. There is no shortage of individuals who have effectively exploited their criminal misdeeds for both fame and a range of material and social rewards that follow in its wake - we can note, for example, the best-selling autobiographies of convicted offenders such as con-man Frank Abagnale (2000), drug dealer Howard Marks (1998), and the armed robber Charles Bronson (2008). All three have built upon their criminal histories a publicly recognisable identity and used their notoriety to launch numerous lucrative spin-off media and professional ventures – Bronson has published a series of books covering variously his prison experiences, his dealings with the notorious Kray twins, and even a fitness guide based upon his prison workout regime; Abagnale has been the subject of a Hollywood movie directed by Steven Spielberg, as well as a Broadway musical, and now runs a successful anti-fraud consultancy in addition to authoring books on crime prevention; Marks has become a successful author, speaker and campaigner for cannabis legalisation, as well as appearing in television shows and films. In all these instances, the individuals have established a mediated presence for their ‘criminal selves’ on an ex-post facto basis, i.e. self-presentation via the media has followed after
their criminal activities and associated convictions. However, in the case of self-presentation via new media, we can note the emergence of a different pattern, and a different association between offending and the representation of that offending, i.e. an *ex ante* pattern in which the desire for mediated self-presentation *(what I call the will-to-representation)* plays a crucial role in motivating the offending behaviour itself. In other words, the desire for social recognition through self-representation has a criminogenic dimension, one whose potentiality is more fully realised once the means for such mediated self-presentation is widely available.

So as to elucidate and exemplify empirically this claim, I turn now to consider a number of instances of user-generated representations that entail the performance of offending behaviour. The first relates to the phenomenon of so-called ‘happy slapping’. The term was first coined by the British press in late 2004 to designate an apparently ‘new craze’ that emerged among school-children in the South London borough of Lewisham (Akwagyriam, 2005). A number of incidents were reported in which young people would assault their peers by slapping or striking them, all the while capturing the incident on a camera-phone, the recording being subsequently circulated via multimedia phone messaging (Nightingale, 2007). As the phenomenon spread, recordings of the incidents were disseminated via video-hosting and file-sharing sites and through social network platforms (Mann, 2008). Moreover, the practice seemingly spread beyond assaults on peers to encompass attacks on strangers (on the street and on public transport), and in some instances extended to serious assault, rape and homicide (Sulaiman, 2005; Saunders, 2005). Commentators have explained the phenomenon by recourse to a wide variety of alleged ‘causes’ – everything ranging from the imitation of reality TV shows (such as *Jackass* and *Dirty Sanchez*), through an entertainment culture that offers pleasure in ritual humiliation, to the influence of ill-defined cultural attitudes associated with ‘yobs’ and ‘chavs’ (Saunders, 2005; Mörtенböck and Mooshammer, 2006) or the extension of dynamics associated with ‘gang violence’ (King, Walpole and Lamon, 2007). Others have sought to defuse the problem by suggesting that it has been exaggerated in public, political and media discourse, in keeping with the dynamics of ‘moral panics’ (Crace, 2005; Barnfield, 2005; Hier, Lett, Walby and Smith, 2011). I do not discount the potential validity of the latter claim, and it may well be that press, political and public concerns about the problem are disproportionate in light of the actual extent of such incidents. However, insofar as such incidents have undoubtedly occurred (and have been documented as part of criminal investigations leading to numerous convictions), my interest here is the ways in which their genesis might best be understood. As Hayward (2012: 24–25) notes, ‘happy slapping’ partakes of a complex cultural dynamic in which ‘media technology’s seepage into the practice of everyday life’ plays an important role. In keeping with the general hypothesis being proposed, I would argue that crucial to understanding this phenomenon is the role played by participants’ desire to be seen, and esteemed or celebrated, by others for their criminal activities. The filming of the assaults is not, I would contend, either coincidental or opportunistic – we are not confronted here with circumstances in which an act in the process of commission conveniently happens to be captured by someone at the scene who just happens to have a recording device at hand (as is often the case in instances of so-called ‘citizen journalism’ where quick thinking bystanders photograph or record an incident in the proximity of which they serendipitously find themselves; Allan, 2007). Rather, the incident is engineered or instigated with the specific and express purpose of recording it and disseminating that record via electronic networks of communication. This purposeful organisation is apparent
when we consider the ways in which such attacks are typically undertaken, involving a group of two or more perpetrators, thereby enabling a division of labour in which at least one member is free to record the incident while others perform the assault. In short, the desire to represent the (criminal) self becomes in such cases a criminogenic factor – people offend in order to be seen doing so by others.

The role played by the will-to-representation in the genesis of such offences is further supported by the kinds of narrative commentary that perpetrators provide, either preceding or during the assaults. For example, in July 2007 Anthony Andrews and two friends saw a neighbour, Christine Lakinski, collapse on a street in the English town of Hartlepool. Anderson proceeded to urinate on the collapsed woman (who subsequently died at the scene), declaring ‘this is YouTube material!’ while being filmed on a camera-phone by Simon Whitehead, one of his friends (BBC News, 2007; Stokes, 2007). Telling here is the self-understanding expressed by the perpetrator of the assault – no reference is made to the victim, or the perpetrator’s feelings about her as a reason or motivation for the assault. Rather, the attack is characterised as a ‘performative’ and expressive act whose purpose and ‘value’ lies in its suitability for mediated representation – what matters to the attacker is primarily that it offers an opportunity to appeal to an audience of online viewers.

In a further incident in 2009, two teenage boys attacked 67-year-old Ekram Haque (who subsequently died in hospital). Evidence obtained by police from mobile phones revealed that the boys had perpetrated and recorded a number of other assaults in the weeks preceding this incident – far from being an isolated or spontaneous event, it was part of a concerted pattern in which violent crimes were not only committed but enacted for the camera – action and its representation are part of an intertwined social practice in which mediation is an integral element. Also noteworthy here for present purposes is that fact that the boys identified themselves as part of a group they dubbed Lane Gang Productions (BBC News, 2010) – suggesting that the practice of recording was central to the boys’ self-understandings and the rationale for engaging in the assaults in the first place; indeed, the self-characterisation as a ‘production’ organisation bespeaks an aspirational yearning for participation in the mediasphere that increasingly confers social standing to those who achieve visibility and celebrity. A similar logic of action is apparent in a third incident that occurred in Werribee, a suburb of Melbourne. Here, a group of eight teenagers sexually assaulted a girl, urinated on her and tried repeatedly to set her on fire. Not only did they film the assault, but subsequently edited the footage and created DVDs, which they proceeded to sell at a number of nearby schools for AU$5 per copy (Petrie, 2006; Rennie, 2007). In this case, the perpetrators capture perfectly the logic of the commercial exploitation of crime, seeing it not only as an opportunity to be seen but also to profit financially from the visibility that representation affords – an entrepreneurial mirroring of the kinds of ‘celebrated criminality’ noted earlier, but this time exploiting the opportunities that new media technologies afford for samizdat production. In a fourth instance, the logic of mediation is taken to a reflexive or meta-level: four youths filmed a fatal attack on a 38-year-old man in London, prefacing the assault by declaring that ‘we’re filming a documentary about happy slapping’ (Jewkes, 2009: 530). All of these incidents support the conclusion that the yearning to represent and mediate the self in the act of ‘transgression’ comes to serve as a motivation for violence – the desire to been seen, and to seek recognition from others for one’s acts, underpins the instigation of criminal acts. The potential for profit from mediated participation in ‘real crime’ further amplifies the association of offending, mediated spectacle and social visibility.
A second instance in which we can see the dynamics of mediation, visibility and crime at play are the urban ‘riots’ that took place across numerous UK cities in August 2011. Over the space of a week, disturbances in cities including London, Birmingham, Manchester and Bristol brought thousands of individuals into the streets, resulting in numerous incidents of looting, arson, robbery, assault and property damage. In the wake of the events, much was made by police, politicians and the press of the role supposedly played by new social media in the genesis of the disturbances. In particular, it was suggested that social media such as Facebook and Twitter (as well as BlackBerry’s bespoke mobile phone messenger service) had been used by participants as a means of disseminating information about incidents in real time, and utilised as a means of social coordination to facilitate the ‘rioting’ and to better evade the police (Gentleman, 2011). A number of Facebook users were subsequently jailed for using the site to ‘incite violence’ (Bowcott, 2011; Bradshaw, 2011). Such was the political concern about the role played by new communication technologies that UK Prime Minister David Cameron reportedly considered shutting down access to Internet services at the height of the disturbances (Williams, 2011). The extent of the role played by social media in the disturbances has been contested both by media providers themselves (Bradshaw, 2011) and by academic commentators who have expressed caution in jumping to ill-evidenced conclusions (Newburn, 2011). However, what is noteworthy for the purposes of the present discussion is the way in which emphasis upon the role of new media in organising criminal behaviour has overshadowed other aspects of the relationship between mediation and offending. Quite apart from any utilisation of new media as a means of social coordination, we need to consider the ways in which the desire for self-presentation via those same media channels may have been implicated in events. Instead of reading postings and messages as simply ‘incitement’, we need to understand that they afforded users with opportunities for expressive identification, a means through which they could (at least symbolically) position themselves as actors in the play of transgression, irrespective of whether they were involved physically in the events themselves. A second noteworthy feature of the ‘riots’ was the extent to which participants themselves recorded the events using camera-phones and shared these representations via social media – participation and representation are in such instances intimately entwined. A third feature is the way in which some of the participants posed for photographs in which they proudly displayed their looted haul, thereby making claims for social recognition of their ‘achievements’ (Evans, 2011). On the face of it, such behaviour would seem ‘irrational’, insofar as criminological theory would ordinarily suppose that it is in the offender’s interest to avoid identification and thus apprehension by the authorities. Theorists of both terrestrial and virtual crimes have certainly argued that anonymity is a constituent element of criminogenic situations (Aas, 2007; Reyns, 2010). However, the flagrant eschewal of anonymity and the public sharing of images that amount to an admission of guilt make perfect sense if we grasp the role played by the desire for mediated self-representation in the genesis of transgression.

A different form of law-breaking behaviour, that nonetheless partakes of the same relationship between transgressive action and the will-to-representation, is the phenomenon of ‘tram surfing’ or ‘train surfing’. Here, the participants place themselves (and potentially others) at significant risk by riding on the outside of moving trams and trains, and sometimes jumping from them at speed. The practices of tram and train surfing can be traced back to at least the 1980s, with numerous recorded (and fatal) incidents in cities with extensive urban train and tram networks such as Berlin (Strauch, Wirth and Geserick, 1998). However, the practice appears to have become far more
widespread in recent years, with many recorded incidents in Sweden, the UK, the United States, South Africa and Australia, among other countries (Pyke, 2000; Wright, 2009; Kendall, 2010). The practice can be linked to a wider involvement in voluntary risk-taking behaviour, such as the ‘extreme sports’ explored by Lyng (1990, 2005), and has been analysed as a manifestation of hegemonic masculinity among young men (Malone, 2005; Hesselink, 2008). The role of media in such behaviour has been noted, but this has been confined to a rather conventional claim that it is imitative of scenarios of train surfing appearing in Hollywood action films such as Money Train, Die Hard, Mission Impossible and Speed (Malone, 2005: 171). The role of self-mediation enabled by user-generated content and new media channels of distribution has been notably overlooked in explanations for the popularity of train and tram surfing. The explosion in participation in surfing has taken place over the same period that camera-phones and the World Wide Web have become widely available, and I would argue that this association is not simply coincidental. It has become commonplace for ‘surfers’ to film their exploits and upload the recordings via social media sites such as MySpace and video-sharing sites such as YouTube and Dailymotion. YouTube, for example, features a dedicated ‘train surfing’ channel created by German enthusiasts, and there are now a number of Facebook pages dedicated to the activity. These new media channels offer, I would suggest, key opportunities for individuals to construct and perform a ‘transgressive’ self, the mediated presentation of which serves as a means for garnering recognition from a distributed community of (real and imagined) peers. The engagement with illegal and high-risk activities is integrally related to the ability of actors to be seen and become esteemed by others for their performative transgressions.

Conclusion
The foregoing instances of transgressive self-representation might also be supplemented by discussion of other similar phenomena, such as the popularity of user-generated content depicting ‘extreme no-hold-barred’ illegal fighting (McCarthy, 2006) and so-called ‘bumfights’ in which homeless people are induced to fight for the camera in exchange for alcohol or drugs (Hayward, 2012: 25). While there is insufficient space here to explore these (and other related) practices, it is hoped that the instances discussed thus far serve to exemplify the underlying theoretical proposition, namely, that an altered relationship between the subject and mediation can significantly reshape the relationship between media and the genesis of offending behaviour. What is at stake here are issues of both ontology (how we conceive the relationship between media and social subjects) and aetiology (the interconnection between representation and action). The confluence of a will-to-representation as an integral element of self-assertion, and the availability of means for demotic self-representation and its technological mediation, creates a new confluence in the relationship between the criminological subject and criminal representations. This emerging relationship has heretofore largely been neglected in criminological discussions of ‘crime and media’, which to a significant degree continue to operate within analytical and theoretical frameworks organised by understandings of ‘old’ rather than ‘new’ media. Therefore, careful attention to both the social-structural features of new media forms, and to the emergent practices of self-representation associated with those forms, is needed if criminology is to more adequately grasp the place of mediation in the genesis of crime and transgression.
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Notes
1. I derive the concept of a ‘will to representation’ loosely from Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation (1967). Schopenhauer conceptualises representation as a mental image of an object, including the subject’s own body which becomes the immediate object of such representation. I extend this concept of a subject representing itself beyond the realm of ‘mental images’ to the practice of symbolic and social communication.
2. As Morris and Ogan (2006) put it: ‘In creating new configurations of sources, messages, and receivers, new communication technologies force researchers to examine their old definitions.’
3. The rise of user-generated media content has been subject to competing normative assessments. On the one hand, the likes of Gauntlett (2011: 2–3) argue that new media technologies unleash social creativity and greater connectivity with the social and physical environment. In contrast, Keen (2008) argues that user-generated content unleashes a flood of mediocrity, unchecked by editorial control or discrimination according to standards of quality.
4. The incitement of the will-to-representation can be seen as the corollary of what Thompson (2005) call the ‘new visibility’ that takes centre stage in a culture saturated with electronic mediation.
5. A recent study of bullying and cyber-bullying among UK school pupils (age 11–16) found that while forms of victimisation such as harassment via text and phone call were most frequently experienced, a small minority of children also reported the kinds of picture- and video-based victimisation associated with ‘happy slapping’ (Smith et al., 2008: 379).
6. This is not to suggest that the performance of abuse for the camera is a phenomenon unique to the digital age of new media. Rather, as Bourke (1999) explores, such practices can be traced at least as far back as the early 20th century, taking place especially in the contexts of war, genocide and other atrocities. The recording of torture and ritual humiliation of detainees by US service personnel at Abu Ghraib prison are but the most recent instance (see Carrabine, 2011). However, I would suggest that demotic self-representation via new media channels takes this play of violent spectacle beyond the specific contexts of military conflict, disbursing it into the fabric of everyday life.
7. www.youtube.com/trainsurfing

References


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