GLOBALISATION AS HYBRIDISATION

Jan Nederveen Pieterse

Abstract Globalisation is usually interpreted as a process of homogenisation, but considering that there are multiple globalisation processes at work this is hardly adequate. Globalisation is also often tied up with modernity, which in effect equates globalisation with Westernisation, which is historically shallow and analytically narrow. This paper argues instead for viewing globalisation as hybridisation: structural hybridisation, or the emergence of new, mixed forms of cooperation, and cultural hybridisation, or the development of translocal mélange cultures. Theorising hybridity and reflecting on the politics of hybridity shows the varieties of hybridity, from mimicry to counter-hegemony. The other side of hybridity is transcultural convergence. Two distinct concepts of culture are in use: territorial and translocal, inward and outward-looking – which produce divergent views on cultural relations and globalisation. Hybridisation refers to the closed concept of culture and to its opening up, in the process ushering in post-hybridity. This is an argument for post-inter/national sociology of hybrid times, spaces and formations.

The most common interpretations of globalisation are the idea that the world is becoming more uniform and standardised, through a technological, commercial and cultural synchronisation emanating from the West, and that globalisation is tied up with modernity. These perspectives are interrelated, if only in that they are both variations on an underlying theme of globalisation as Westernisation. The former is critical in intent, while the latter is ambiguous. My argument takes issue with both these interpretations as narrow assessments of globalisation and instead argues for viewing globalisation as a process of hybridisation which gives rise to a global mélange.

Globalisations in the plural: probing

Globalisation, according to Albrow, ‘refers to all those processes by which the peoples of the world are incorporated into a single world society, global society’ (1990 : 9). Since these processes are plural, we may as well conceive of globalisations in the plural. Thus, in social science there are as many conceptualisations of globalisation as there are disciplines. In economics, globalisation refers to economic internationalisation and the spread of capitalist market relations. ‘The global economy is the system generated by globalising production and global finance’ (Cox 1992 : 30). In international relations, the focus is on the increasing density of inter-state relations and the development of global politics. In sociology, the concern is with increasing worldwide social densities and the emergence of a ‘world society’. In cultural studies, the focus is on global communications and worldwide cultural standardisation, as in CocaColonisation and McDonaldisation, and on post-colonial culture. In history, the concern is with conceptualising ‘global history’ (Mazlish and Buultjens 1993).

All these approaches and themes are relevant if we view globalisation as a
multidimensional process which, like all significant social processes, unfolds in multiple realms of existence simultaneously. Accordingly, globalisation may be understood in terms of an open-ended synthesis of several disciplinary approaches. This extends beyond social science; for instance, to ecological concerns, technology (Henderson 1989) and agricultural techniques (for example, the green revolution).

Another way to conceive of globalisations in the plural is that there are as many modes of globalisation as there are globalising agents and dynamics or impulses. Historically these range from long-distance cross-cultural trade, religious organisations and knowledge networks to contemporary multinational corporations, transnational banks, international institutions, technological exchange, and transnational networks of social movements. We can further differentiate between globalisation as policy and project – as in the case of Amnesty International which is concerned with internationalising human rights standards – or as unintended consequence – as in the case of the ‘globalising panic’ of AIDS. Globalism is the policy of furthering or managing (a particular mode of) globalisation. In political economy it refers to policies furthering or accommodating economic internationalisation (Petras and Brill 1985) or to the corporate globalism of transnational enterprises (Gurтов 1988); and in foreign affairs, to the global stance in US foreign policy, both in its initial post-war posture (Ambrose 1971) and its post-Cold War stance.

These varied dimensions all point to the inherent fluidity, indeterminacy and open-endedness of globalisations. If this is the point of departure, it becomes less obvious to think of globalisations in terms of standardisation and less likely that globalisations can be one-directional processes, either structurally or culturally.

*Globalisation and modernity: theoretical and historical aspects*

Modernism is a keynote in reflections on globalisation in sociology. In several prominent conceptualisations, globalisation is the corollary of modernity (for example, Giddens 1990). It is not difficult to understand this trend. In conjunction with globalisation, modernity provides a structure and periodisation. In addition, this move reflects the general thematisation of modernity in social science from Habermas to Berman. Together globalisation and modernity make up a ready-made package. Ready-made because it closely resembles the earlier, well established conceptualisation of globalisation: the Marxist theme of the spread of the world market. The time and pace are the same in both interpretations: the process starts in the 1500s and experiences its high tide from the late nineteenth century. The structures are the same: the nation-state and individualisation – vehicles of modernity or, in the Marxist paradigm, corollaries of the spread of the world market. In one conceptualisation universalism refers to the logic of the market and the law of value, and in the other, to modern values of achievement. World-system theory is the most well known conceptualisation of globalisation in the Marxist lineage; its achievement has been to make ‘society’ as the unit of analysis
appear a narrow focus, while on the other hand it has faithfully replicated the familiar constraints of Marxist determinism (Nederveen Pieterse 1987).

There are several problems associated with the modernity/globalisation approach. In either conceptualisation, whether centred on capitalism or modernity, globalisation begins in and emanates from Europe and the West. In effect it is a theory of Westernisation by another name, which replicates all the problems associated with Eurocentrism: a narrow window on the world, historically and culturally. With this agenda, it should be called Westernisation and not globalisation.

Another problem is that globalisation theory turns into or becomes an annex of modernisation theory. While modernisation theory is a past station in sociology and development theory, it is making a comeback under the name of globalisation – the 1950s and 1960s revisited under a large global umbrella. Robertson (1992 : 138–45) takes issue with the prioritisation of modernity in Giddens’ work. Robertson’s approach to globalisation is multi-dimensional with an emphasis on socio-cultural processes. At the same time, his preoccupation with themes such as ‘global order’ is, according to Arnason, ‘indicative of a Parsonian approach, transferred from an artificially isolated and unified society to the global condition’ (1990 : 222). Neo-modernisation theory (Tiryakian 1991) and the contemporary re-thematisation of modernity indicate the continuing interest in modernisation thinking, but the problems remain.

The tendency to focus on social structure produces an account from which the dark side of modernity is omitted. What of modernity in the light of Bauman’s Modernity and the Holocaust (1989)? While the Marxist perspective involves a critical agenda, the thematisation of modernity, whether or not it serves as a stand-in for capitalism, does not.

...the ambiguities involved in this discourse are such that it is possible, within it, to lose any sense of cultural domination: to speak of modernity can be to speak of cultural change as ‘cultural fate’ in the strong sense of historical...inevitability. This would be to abandon any project of rational cultural critique. (Tomlinson 1991 : 141)

Generally questions of power are marginalised in both the capitalism and modernity perspectives. Another dimension which tends to be conspicuously absent from modernity accounts is imperialism. Modernity accounts tend to be societally inward looking, in a rarefied sociological narrative, as if modernity precedes and conditions globalisation, and not the other way round: globalisation constituting one of the conditions for modernity.

The implication of the modernity/globalisation view is that the history of globalisation begins with the history of the West. But is not precisely the point of globalisations as a perspective that globalisations begin with world history? The modernity/globalisation view is not only geographically narrow (westernisation) but also historically shallow (1500 plus). The time frame of some of the perspectives relevant to globalisation is as follows.

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Timing of globalisation

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Apparantly the broad heading of globalisation accommodates some very different views. The basic understanding is usually a neutral formulation, such as ‘Globalization can thus be defined as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa’ (Giddens 1990: 64). The ‘intensification of worldwide social relations’ can be thought of as a long-term process which finds its beginnings in the first migrations of peoples and long-distance trade connections, and subsequently accelerates under particular conditions (the spread of technologies, religions, literacy, empires, capitalism). Or, it can be thought of as consisting only of the later stages of this process, from the time of the accelerating formation of global social relations, and as a specifically global momentum associated with particular conditions (the development of a world market, Western imperialism, modernity). It can be narrowed down further by regarding globalisation as a particular epoch and formation – as in Tomlinson’s view of globalisation as the successor to imperialism (rather than imperialism being a mode of globalisation), Jameson’s view of the new cultural space created by late capitalism, and Harvey’s argument where globalisation is associated with the post-modern condition of time-space compression and flexible accumulation.

But, whichever the emphasis, globalisation as the ‘intensification of worldwide social relations’ presumes the prior existence of ‘worldwide social relations’, so that globalisation is the conceptualisation of a phase following an existing condition of globality and part of an ongoing process of the formation of worldwide social relations. The recognition of historical depth brings globalisations back to world history and beyond the radius of modernity/Westernisation.

One way around the problem of modernisation/Westernisation is the notion of multiple paths of modernisation, which avoids the onus of Eurocentrism and provides an angle for reproblematising Western development. We come across this notion in Benjamin Nelson (1981) as part of his concern with ‘intercivilizational encounters’ and several others (for example, Therborn 1992). The idea that ‘all societies create their own modernity’ also forms part of development discourse analysis, along with the theme of ‘reworking modernity’ in the context of popular culture and memory (Watts 1993: 265; Rowe and Schelling 1991).

The modernisation in the plural approach matches the notion of the historicity of modernisation which is common in Southeast and East Asia (Singh 1989). That Japanese modernisation has followed a different path from that of
the West is a cliché in Japanese sociology (Tominaga 1990) and well established in Taiwan and China (Li 1989; Sonoda 1990). It results in an outlook that resembles the argument of polycentrism and multiple paths of development (Amin 1990). But this remains a static and one-dimensional representation: the multiplication of centres still hinges on centrum. It is not much use to make up for Eurocentrism and occidental narcissism by opting for other centrisms, such as Afrocentrism, Indocentrism, Sinocentrism, or polycentrism. In effect, it echoes the turn of the century Pan-movements: Plan-Slavism, Pan-Islamism, Pan-Arabism, Pan-Turkism, Pan-Europeanism, Pan-Africanism, and so on, in which the logic of nineteenth-century racial classifications is carried further under the heading of civilisational provinces turned into political projects. This may be the substitution of one centrism and parochialism for another and miss the fundamental point of the ‘globalisation of diversity’, of the mélange effect pervading everywhere, from the heartlands to the extremities and vice versa.

**Structural hybridisation: concept and theory formation**

With respect to cultural forms, hybridisation is defined as ‘the ways in which forms become separated from existing practices and recombine with new forms in new practices’ (Rowe and Schelling 1991 : 231). This principle can be extended to structural forms of social organisation.

It is now a familiar argument that nation-state formation is an expression and function of globalisation and not a process contrary to it (Robertson 1992; Greenfield 1992). At the same time, it is apparent that the present phase of globalisation involves the relative weakening of nation-states – as in the weakening of the ‘national economy’ in the context of economic globalism and, culturally, the decline of patriotism. But this too is not simply a one-directional process. Thus the migration movements which make up demographic globalisation can engender absentee patriotism and long-distance nationalism, as in the political affinities of Irish, Jewish and Palestinian diasporas and emigré or exiled Sikhs in Toronto, Tamils in London, Kurds in Germany, Tibetans in India (Anderson 1992).

Globalisation can mean the reinforcement of or go together with localism, as in ‘Think globally, act locally’. This kind of tandem operation of local/global dynamics, or globalisation, is at work in the case of minorities who appeal to transnational human rights standards beyond state authorities, or indigenous peoples who find support for local demands from transnational networks. The upsurge of ethnic identity politics and religious revival movements can also be viewed in the light of globalisation. ‘Identity patterns are becoming more complex, as people assert local loyalties but want to share in global values and lifestyles’ (Ken Booth, quoted in Lipschutz 1992 : 396). Particularity, notes Robertson, is a global value and what is taking place is a ‘universalization of particularism’ or ‘the global valorization of particular identities’ (1992 : 130, 1994).

Global dynamics, such as the fluctuations of commodity prices on the world market, can result in the reconstruction of ethnic identities, as occurred in
Africa in the 1980s (Shaw 1986). State development policies can engender a backlash of ethnic movements (Kothari 1988). Thus, ‘globalisation can generate forces of both fragmentation and unification…globalisation can engender an awareness of political difference as much as an awareness of common identity; enhanced international communications can highlight conflicts of interest and ideology, and not merely remove obstacles to mutual understanding’ (Held 1992 : 32).

Globalisation can mean the reinforcement of both supranational and subnational regionalism. The European Union is a case in point. Formed in response to economic challenges from Japan and the United States, it represents more than the internal market and is in the process of becoming an administrative, legal, political and cultural formation, involving multiple Europes: a Europe of the nations, the regions, ‘European civilisation’, Christianities, and so on. The dialectics of unification mean, for instance, that constituencies in Northern Ireland can appeal to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg on the decisions of British courts, or that Catalonia can outflank Madrid and Brittany outmanoeuvre Paris by appealing to Brussels or by establishing links with other regions (for example, between Catalonia and the Ruhr area). Again, there is an ongoing flow or cascade of globalisation – regionalism – subregionalism. Or, ‘Globalization encourages macro-regionalism, which, in turn, encourages micro-regionalism’ (Cox 1992 : 34).

Micro-regionalism in poor areas will be a means not only of affirming cultural identities but of claiming pay-offs at the macro-regional level for maintaining political stability and economic good behaviour. The issues of redistribution are thereby raised from the sovereign state level to the macro-regional level, while the manner in which redistributed wealth is used becomes decentralised to the micro-regional level. (Cox 1992 : 35)

What globalisation means in terms of social structure, then, is the increase in the available modes of organisation: transnational, international, macro-regional, national, micro-regional, municipal, local. This ladder of administrative levels is being criss-crossed by functional networks of corporations, international organisations, non-governmental organisations as well as professionals and computer users. Part of this has been termed the ‘internationalization of the state’ as states are ‘increasingly engaged in multilateral forms of international governance’ (Held and McGrew 1993 :271). This approximates Rosenau’s conceptualisation (1990) of the structure of ‘postinternational politics’ made up of two interactive worlds with overlapping memberships: a state-centric world, in which the primary actors are national, and a multi-centric world of diverse actors, such as corporations, international organisations, ethnic groups, churches. These multi-centric functional networks in turn are nested within broader sprawling ‘scapes’, such as finanscapes, ethnoscapes (Appadurai 1990).

Furthermore, not only these modes of organisation are important but also the informal spaces that are created-in-between, in the interstices. Inhabited by
diasporas, migrants, exiles, refugees, nomads, these are sites of what Michael Mann (1986) calls ‘interstitial emergence’ and identifies as important sources of social renewal.

In political economy we can also identify a range of hybrid formations. The notion of articulation of modes of production may be viewed as a principle of hybridisation. The dual economy argument saw neatly divided economic sectors, while the articulation argument sees interactive sectors giving rise to mélange effects, such as ‘semi-proletarians’ who have one foot in the agrarian subsistence sector. Counterposed to the idea of the dual economy split in traditional/modern and feudal/capitalist sectors, the articulation argument holds that what has been taking place is an interpenetration of modes of production. Uneven articulation has, in turn, given rise to phenomena such as asymmetric integration (Terhal 1987). Dependency theory may be read as a theory of structural hybridisation in which dependent capitalism is a mélange category in which the logics of capitalism and imperialism have merged. Recognition of this hybrid condition is what distinguishes neo-Marxism from classical Marxism (in which capital was regarded as a ‘permanently revolutionising force’): i.e., regular capitalism makes for development, but dependent capitalism makes for the ‘development of underdevelopment’. The contested notion of semi-periphery may also be viewed as a hybrid formation. In a wider context, the mixed economy, the informal sector, and the ‘third sector’ of the ‘social economy’, comprising cooperative and non-profit organisations (Defourny and Monzón Campos 1992), may be viewed as hybrid economic formations.

Hybrid formations constituted by the interpenetration of diverse logics manifest themselves in hybrid sites and spaces. Thus, urbanisation in the context of the fusion of pre-capitalist and capitalist modes of production, as in parts of Latin America, may give rise to ‘cities of peasants’ (Roberts 1978). Border zones are the meeting places of different organisational modes – such as Free Enterprise Zones and offshore banking facilities (hybrid meeting places of state sovereignty and transnational enterprise), overseas military facilities and surveillance stations (Enloe 1989). Borderlands generally have become a significant topos (Anzaldúa 1987). The blurring and reworking of the distinction between public and private spaces is a familiar theme (for example, Helly and Reverby 1992). Global cities (Sassen 1991) and ethnically mixed neighbourhoods within them (such as Jackson Heights in Queens, New York) are other hybrid spaces in the global landscape. The use of information technology in supranational financial transactions (Wachtel 1990) has given rise to a hyperspace of capital.

Another dimension of hybridity concerns the experience of time, as in the notion of mixed times (tiempos mixtos) common in Latin America, where it refers to the coexistence and interspersion of premodernity, modernity and postmodernity (Caldéron 1988; Vargas 1992). A similar point is that ‘intrinsic asynchrony’ is a ‘general characteristic of Third World cultures’ (Hölsle 1992: 237).

Globalisation, then, increases the range of organisational options, all of which are in operation simultaneously. Each or a combination of these may be
relevant in specific social, institutional, legal, political, economic or cultural spheres. What matters is that no single mode has a necessary overall priority or monopoly. This is one of the salient differences between the present phase of globalisation and the preceding era from the 1840s to the 1960s, the great age of nationalism when by and large the nation-state was the single dominant organisational option (Harris 1990). While the spread of the nation-state has been an expression of globalisation, the dynamic has not stopped there.

The overall tendency towards increasing global density and interdependence, or globalisation, thus translates into the pluralisation of organisational forms. Structural hybridisation and the mélange of diverse modes of organisation give rise to a pluralisation of forms of cooperation and competition as well as to novel mixed forms of cooperation. This is the structural corollary to flexible specialisation and just-in-time capitalism and, on the other hand, to cultural hybridisation and multiple identities. Multiple identities and the decentring of the social subject are grounded in the ability of individuals to avail themselves of several organisational options at the same time. Thus globalisation is the framework for the diversification and amplification of ‘sources of the self’.

A different concern is the scope and depth of the historical field. The Westernisation/modernity views on globalisation only permit a global momentum with a short memory. Globalisation taken broadly, however, refers to the formation of a worldwide historical field and involves the development of global memory, arising from shared global experiences. Such shared global experiences range from various intercivilisational encounters, such as long-distance trade and migration to slavery, conquest, war, imperialism, colonialism. It has been argued that the latter would be irrelevant to global culture:

Unlike national cultures, a global culture is essentially memoryless. When the ‘nation’ can be constructed so as to draw upon and receive latent popular experiences and needs, a ‘global culture’ answers to no living needs, no identity-in-the-making There are no ‘world memories’ that can be used to unite humanity; the most global experiences to date – colonialism and the World Wars – can only serve to remind us of our historic cleavages. (Smith 1990 : 180)

If, however, conflict, conquest and oppression would only divide people, then nations themselves would merely be artefacts of division, for they too were mostly born out of conflict (for example, Hechter 1975). Likewise, on the larger canvas, it would be shallow and erroneous to argue that the experiences of conflict merely divide humanity: they also unite humankind, even if in painful ways and producing an ambivalent kind of unity (Abdel-Malek 1981; Nederveen Pieterse 1990 : Ch. 15). Unity emerging out of antagonism and conflict is the ABC of dialectics. It is a recurrent theme in post-colonial literature such as, for example, The Intimate Enemy (Nandy 1983).

The intimacy constituted by repression and resistance is not an uncommon notion either, as hinted in the title of the Israeli author Uri Avneri’s book about Palestinians, My Friend the Enemy (1986). A conflictual unity bonded by common political and cultural experiences, including the experience of domination, has been part of the make-up of hybrid post-colonial cultures. Thus the
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former British Empire remains in many ways a unitary space featuring a common language, common elements in legal and political systems, infrastructure, traffic rules, an imperial architecture which is in many ways the same in India as in South Africa, along with the legacy of the Commonwealth (King 1991).

Robertson makes reference to the deep history of globality, particularly in relation to the spread of world religions, but reserves the notion of globalisation for later periods, starting in the 1500s, considering that what changes over time is ‘the scope and depth of consciousness of the world as a single place’. In his view ‘contemporary globalization’ also refers to ‘cultural and subjective matters’ and involves awareness of the global human condition, a global consciousness that carries reflexive connotations (1992 : 183). No doubt this reflexivity is significant, because it also signals the potential capability of humanity to act upon the global human condition. On the other hand, there is no good reason why such reflexivity should stop at the gates of the West and not also arise from and be cognisant of the deep history of intercivilisational connections including, for instance, the influence of the world religions.

Global mélange: windows for research on globalisation

How do we come to terms with phenomena such as Thai boxing by Moroccan girls in Amsterdam, Asian rap in London, Irish bagels, Chinese tacos and Mardi Gras Indians in the United States, or ‘Mexican schoolgirls dressed in Greek togas dancing in the style of Isidora Duncan’ (Rowe and Schelling 1991 : 161)? How do we interpret Peter Brook directing the Mahabharata, or Ariane Mnouchkine staging a Shakespeare play in Japanese Kabuki style for a Paris audience in the Théâtre Soleil? Cultural experiences, past or present, have not been simply moving in the direction of cultural uniformity and standardisation.

This is not to say that the notion of global cultural synchronisation (Schiller 1989; Hamelink 1983) is irrelevant, on the contrary; but it is fundamentally incomplete. It overlooks the countercurrents – the impact non-Western cultures have been making on the West. It plays down the ambivalence of the globalising momentum and ignores the role of the local reception of Western culture; for example, the indigenisation of Western elements. It fails to see the influence non-Western cultures have been exercising on one another. It leaves no room for cross-over culture – as in the development of ‘third cultures’, such as world music. It overrates the homogeneity of Western culture and overlooks the fact that many of the standards exported by the West and its cultural industries themselves turn out to be of culturally mixed character if we examine their cultural lineages. Centuries of South–North cultural osmosis have resulted in an intercontinental cross-over culture. European and Western culture are part of this global mélange. This is an obvious case if we reckon that Europe until the fourteenth century was invariably the recipient of cultural influences from the ‘Orient’. The hegemony of the West dates back to only a very recent time, from 1800, and, arguably, to industrialisation.

One of the terms offered to describe this interplay is the creolisation of
global culture (Hannerz 1987; Friedman 1990). This approach is derived from creole languages and linguistics. Creolisation is itself an odd, hybrid term. In the Caribbean and North America it stands for the mixture of African and European (the creole cuisine of New Orleans, and so on), while in Hispanic America criollo originally denotes those of European descent born on the continent. ‘Creolisation’ means a Caribbean window on the world. Part of its appeal is that it goes against the grain of nineteenth-century racism and the accompanying abhorrence of métissage as miscegenation, as in Comte de Gobineau’s view that race mixture leads to decadence and decay, for in every mixture the lower element is bound to predominate. The doctrine of racial purity involves the fear of and disdain for the half-caste. By stressing and putting the mestizo factor, the mixed and in-between, in the foreground, creolisation highlights what has been hidden and valorises boundary crossing. It also implies an argument with Westernisation: the West itself may be viewed as a mixture and Western culture as a creole culture.

The Latin American term mestizaje also refers to a boundary crossing mixture. Since the early part of the century, however, this has served as a hegemonic elite ideology, which in effect refers to ‘whitening’ or Europeanisation as the overall project for Latin American countries: while the European element is supposed to maintain the upper hand, through the gradual ‘whitening’ of the population and culture, Latin America is supposed to achieve modernity (Graham 1990; Whitten and Torres 1992). A limitation of both creolisation and mestizaje is that they are confined to the experience of the post-sixteenth-century Americas.

Another terminology is the ‘orientalisation of the world’, which has been referred to as ‘a distinct global process’ (Featherstone 1990). In Duke Ellington’s words, ‘We are all becoming a little Oriental’ (quoted in Fischer 1992 : 32). It is reminiscent of the theme of ‘East wind prevails over West wind’, which runs through Sultan Galiev, Mao and Abdel-Malek. In the setting of the ‘Japanese challenge’ and the development model of East Asian Newly Industrialising Countries, it evokes the Pacific Century and the twenty-first century as the ‘Asian century’ (Park 1985).

Each of these terms—creolisation, mestizaje, orientalisation—opens a different window on the global mélange. In the United States, cross-over denotes the adoption of black cultural characteristics by European Americans and of white elements by African Americans. As a general notion this may aptly describe global intercultural osmosis and interplay. Global cross-over culture may be an appropriate characterisation of the long-term global North–South mélange. Still, what is not clarified are the terms under which cultural interplay and cross-over take place. Likewise, in terms such as global mélange, what is missing is an acknowledgement of the actual unevenness, asymmetry and inequality in global relations.

Theorising hybridity: the search for new directions

Given the backdrop of nineteenth-century discourse, it is no wonder that those arguments which acknowledge hybridity often do so on a note of regret
and loss – loss of purity, wholeness, authenticity. Thus, according to Hisham Sharabi, neo-patriarchal society in the contemporary Arab world is ‘a new, hybrid sort of society/culture’, ‘neither modern nor traditional’ (1988 : 4). The ‘neopatriarchal petty bourgeoisie’ is likewise characterised as a ‘hybrid class’ (ibid. : 6). This argument is based on an analysis of ‘the political and economic conditions of distorted, dependent capitalism’ in the Arab world (ibid. : 5); in other words, it is derived from the framework of dependency theory.

In arguments such as these, hybridity functions as a negative trope, in line with the nineteenth-century paradigm according to which hybridity, mixture, mutation are regarded as negative developments which detract from prelapsarian purity – in society and culture, as in biology. Since the development of Mendelian genetics in the 1870s, and subsequently in early twentieth-century biology, however, a revaluation has taken place according to which cross-breeding and polygenic inheritance has come to be positively valued as enrichments of gene pools. Gradually this has been seeping through in wider circles; the work of Bateson (1972), as one of the few to connect the natural sciences and the social sciences, has been influential in this regard.

In post-structuralist and post-modern analysis, hybridity and syncretism have become keywords. Thus hybridity is the antidote to essentialist notions of identity and ethnicity (Lowe 1991). Cultural syncretism refers to the methodology of montage and collage, to ‘cross-cultural plots of music, clothing, behaviour, advertising, theatre, body language, orvisual communication, spreading multi-ethnic and multi-centric patterns’ (Canevacci 1993 : 3, 1992). Interculturalism, rather than multiculturalism, is a keynote of this kind of perspective. But it also raises different problems. What is the political import of the celebration of hybridity? Is it merely another sign of perplexity turned into virtue by those grouped on the consumer end of social change? According to Ella Shohat, ‘A celebration of syncretism and hybridity per se, if not articulated in conjunction with questions of hegemony and neo-colonial power relations, runs the risk of appearing to sanctify the fait accompli of colonial violence’ (1992 : 109). Hence, a further step would be not merely to celebrate but to theorise hybridity.

A theory of hybridity would be attractive. We are so used to theories that are concerned with establishing boundaries and demarcations among phenomena – units or processes that are as neatly as possible set apart from other units or processes – that a theory which instead would focus on fuzziness and mélange, cut-and-mix, criss-cross and cross-over, might well be a relief in itself. Yet ironically, of course, it would have to prove itself by giving as neat as possible a version of messiness, or an unhybrid categorisation of hybridities.

By what yardstick would we differentiate hybridities? One consideration is in what context hybridity functions. At a general level hybridity concerns the mixture of phenomena which are held to be different, separate; hybridisation then refers to a cross-category process. Thus with Bakhtin (1968) hybridisation refers to sites, such as fairs, which bring together the exotic and the familiar, villagers and townspeople, performers and observers. The categories can also be cultures, nations, ethnicities, status groups, classes, genres, and hybridity, by
its very existence, blurs the distinctions among them. Hybridity functions, next, as part of a power relationship between centre and margin, hegemony and minority, and indicates a blurring, destabilisation or subversion of that hierarchical relationship.

One of the original notions of hybridity is syncretism, the fusion of religious forms. Here we can distinguish, on the one hand, syncretism as mimicry – as in Santería,康dombłó，Vodûn, in which Catholic saints are adapted to serve as masks behind which non-Christian forms of worship are practised (for example, Thompson 1984). The Virgin of Guadalupe as a mask for Pacha Mama is another example. On the other hand, we find syncretism as a mélange not only of forms but also of beliefs, a merger in which both religions, Christian and native, have changed and a ‘third religion’ has developed (as in Kimbangism in the Congo).

Another phenomenon is hybridity as migration mélange. A common observation is that second-generation immigrants, in the West and elsewhere, display mixed cultural patterns; for example, a separation between and, next, a mix of a home culture and language (matching the culture of origin) and an outdoor culture (matching the culture of residence), as in the combination ‘Muslim in the daytime, disco in the evening’ (Feddem 1992).

In post-colonial literature, hybridity is a familiar and ambivalent trope. Homi Bhabha (1990) refers to hybrids as intercultural brokers in the interstices between nation and empire, producing counter-narratives from the nation’s margins to the ‘totalizing boundaries’ of the nation. At the same time, refusing nostalgic models of pre-colonial purity, hybrids, by way of mimicry, may conform to the ‘hegemonized rewriting of the Eurocentre’. Hybridity, in this perspective, can be a condition tantamount to alienation, a state of homelessness. Smadar Lavie comments: ‘This is a response-oriented model of hybridity. It lacks agency, by not empowering the hybrid. The result is a fragmented Otherness in the hybrid’ (1992 : 92). In the work of Gloria Anzaldúa and others, she recognises, on the other hand, a community-oriented mode of hybridity, and notes that ‘reworking the past exposes its hybridity, and to recognise and acknowledge this hybrid past in terms of the present empowers the community and gives it agency’ (ibid.).

An ironical case of hybridity as intercultural cross-over is mentioned by Michael Bérubé, interviewing the African American literary critic Houston Baker, Jr: ‘That reminds me of your article in Technoculture, where you write that when a bunch of Columbia-graduate white boys known as Third Bass attack Hammer for not being black enough or strong enough...that’s the moment of hybridity’ (1992 : 551).

Taking in these lines of thought, we can construct a continuum of hybridities: on one end, an assimilationist hybridity that leans over towards the centre, adopts the canon and mimics the hegemony, and, at the other end, a destabilising hybridity that blurs the canon, reverses the current, subverts the centre. Hybridites, then, may be differentiated according to the components and centre of gravity of the mélange. On the one hand, an assimilationist hybridity in which the centre predominates – as in V.S. Naipaul, known for his trenchant
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observations, such as there is no decent cup of coffee to be had in Trinidad, a posture that has given rise to the term Naipaulitis. And, on the other hand, a hybridity that blurs (passive) or destabilises (active) the canon and its categories. Perhaps this spectrum of hybridities can be summed up as ranging from Naipaul to Salman Rushdie (cf. Brennan 1989), Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak. Still, what does it mean to destabilise the canon? It is worth reflecting on the politics of hybridity.

Politics of hybridity: political theory on a global scale?

Relations of power and hegemony are inscribed and reproduced within hybridity, for wherever we look closely enough we find the traces of asymmetry in culture, place, descent. Hence hybridity raises the question of the terms of mixture, the conditions of mixing and mélange. At the same time it is important to note the ways in which hegemony is not merely reproduced but refigured in the process of hybridisation. Generally, what is the bearing of hybridity in relation to political engagement?

At times, the anti-essentialist emphasis on hybrid identities comes dangerously close to dismissing all searches for communitarian origins as an archaeological excavation of an idealized, irretrievable past. Yet, on another level, while avoiding any nostalgia for a prelapsarian community, or for any unitary and transparent identity predating the ‘fall’, we must also ask whether it is possible to forge a collective resistance without inscribing a communal past. (Shohat 1992 : 109)

Is there not a close relationship between political engagement and collective memory? Is not the remembrance of deeds past, the commemoration of collective itineraries, victories and defeats – such as the Matanza for the FMLN in El Salvador, Heroes Day for the ANC – fundamental to the symbolism of resistance and the moral economy of mobilisation?

Still, this line of argument involves several problems. While there may be a link, there is not necessarily a symmetry between communal past/collective resistance. What is the basis of bonding in collective action – past or future, memory or project? While communal symbolism may be important, collective symbolism and discourse merging a heterogeneous collectivity in a common project may be more important. This, while Heroes Day is significant to the ANC (16 December is the founding day of Umkhonto we Sizwe), the Freedom Charter, and specifically, the project of non-racial democracy (non-sexism has been added later) has been of much greater importance. These projects are not of a ‘communal’ nature: part of their strength is precisely that they transcend communal boundaries. Generally, emancipations may be thought of in the plural, as an ensemble of projects that in itself is diverse, heterogeneous, multivocal.5

The argument linking communal past/collective resistance imposes a unity and transparency which in effect reduces the space for critical engagement, for plurality within the movement, diversity within the process of emancipation. It

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privileges a communal view of collective action, a primordialist view of identity, and ignores or plays down the importance of intragroup differences and conflicts over group representation, demands and tactics, including reconstructions of the past. It argues as if the questions of whether demands should be for autonomy or inclusion, whether the group should be inward or outward-looking, have already been settled, while in reality these are political dilemmas.

The nexus between communal past/collective engagement is one strand in political mobilisation, but so are the hybrid past/plural projects, and in everyday politics the point is how to negotiate these strands in roundtable politics. This involves going beyond a past to a future orientation – for what is the point of collective action without a future? The lure of community, powerful and prevalent in left-wing as well as right-wing politics, has been questioned often enough. In contrast, hybridity when thought through as politics, may be subversive of essentialism and homogeneity, disruptive of static spatial and political categories of centre and periphery, high and low, class and ethnos, and in recognising multiple identities, widens the space for critical engagement. Thus the nostalgia paradigm of community politics has been contrasted to the landscape of the city, along with a reading of ‘politics as relations among strangers’ (Young 1990).

What is the significance of this outlook in the context of global inequities and politics? Political theory on a global scale is relatively undeveloped. Traditionally political theory is concerned with the relations between sovereign and people, state and society. It is of little help to turn to the ‘great political theorists’ from Locke to Mill, for they are all essentially concerned with the state–society framework. International relations theory extrapolates from this core preoccupation with concepts such as national interest and balance of power. Strictly speaking, international relations theory, at any rate neo-realist theory, precludes global political theory.

In the absence of a concept of ‘world society’, how can there be a notion of a worldwide social contract or global democracy? This frontier has opened up through concepts such as global civil society, referring to the transnational networks and activities of voluntary and non-governmental organisations: ‘the growth of global civil society represents an ongoing project of civil society to reconstruct, re-imagine, or re-map world politics’ (Lipschutz 1992 : 391). Global society and post-international politics are other relevant notions (Shaw 1992; Rosenau 1990). A limitation to these reconceptualisations remains the absence of legal provisions that are globally binding rather than merely in interstate relations.

The question remains what kind of conceptual tools we can develop to address questions such as the double standards prevailing in global politics: perennial issues, such as Western countries practising democracy at home and imperialism abroad; the edifying use of terms such as self-determination and sovereignty, while the United States are invading Panama or Grenada. The term imperialism may no longer be adequate to address the present situation. It may be adequate in relation to US actions in Panama or Grenada, but less so to describe the Gulf war. Imperialism is the policy of establishing or maintaining
an empire, and empire is the control exercised by a state over the domestic and foreign policy of another political society (Doyle 1986 : 45). This is not an adequate terminology to characterise the Gulf war episode.

If we consider that major actors in today’s global circumstances are the IMF and World Bank, transnational corporations and regional investment banks, it is easy to acknowledge their influence on the domestic policies of countries from Brazil to the Philippines, but the situation differs from imperialism in two ways: the actors are not states and the foreign policy of the countries involved is not necessarily affected. The casual use of terms such as recolonisation or neo-colonialism to describe the impact of IMF conditionalties on African countries remains just that, casual. The situation has changed also with the emergence of regional blocs which can potentially exercise joint foreign policy (for example, the European Union) or which within themselves contain two or more ‘worlds’ (for example, NAFTA, APEC). Both these situations differ from imperialism in the old sense.

Current literature in international political economy shows a shift from ‘imperialism’ to ‘globalisation’. The latter may be used with critical intent (for example, Miliband and Panitch 1992) but is more often used in an open-ended sense. I have used the term critical globalism as an approach to current configurations (Nederveen Pieterse 1993). According to Tomlinson:

the distribution of global power that we know as ‘imperialism’ characterised the modern period up to, say, the 1960s. What replaces ‘imperialism’ is ‘globalisation’. Globalisation may be distinguished from imperialism in that it is far less coherent or culturally directed process. The idea of ‘globalisation’ suggests interconnection and interdependency of all global areas which happens in a less purposeful way. (Tomlinson 1991 : 175)

This is a particularly narrow interpretation in which globalisation matches the epoch of late capitalism and flexible accumulation. Still, what is interesting is the observation that the present phase of globalisation is less coherent and less purposeful than imperialism. That does not mean the end of inequality and domination, although domination may be more dispersed, less orchestrated, more heterogeneous. To address global inequalities and develop global political theory, a different kind of conceptualisation is needed.

We are not without points of reference but we lack a theory of global political action. Melucci (1989) has discussed the ‘planetarisation’ of collective action (Hegedus 1989). Some of the implications of globalisation for democracy have been examined by Held (1992). As regards the basics of a global political consensus, the UN Declaration of Human Rights, and its subsequent amendments by the Movement of Nonaligned Countries, may be a point of reference (Parekh 1992).

Post-hybridity? Or: toward a global vocabulary of culture

Cultural hybridisation refers to the mixing of Asian, African, American, European cultures: hybridisation is the making of global culture as a global
mélange. As a category hybridity serves a purpose on the basis of the assumption of *difference* between the categories, forms, beliefs that go into the mixture. Yet the very process of hybridisation shows the difference to be relative and, with a slight shift of perspective, the relationship can also be described in terms of an affirmation of *similarity*. Thus, the Catholic saints can be taken as icons of Christianity, but can also be viewed as holdovers of pre-Christian paganism inscribed in the Christian canon. In that light, their use as masks for non-Christian gods is less quaint and rather intimates transcultural pagan affinities.

Ariane Mnouchkine’s use of Kabuki style to stage a Shakespeare play leads to the question, which Shakespeare play? The play is ‘Henry IV’, which is set in the context of European high feudalism. In that light, the use of Japanese feudal Samurai style to portray European feudalism (Kreidt 1987 : 255) makes a point about transcultural historical affinities.

‘Mexican schoolgirls dressed in Greek togas dancing in the style of Isidora Duncan’, mentioned before, reflect transnational bourgeois class affinities, mirroring themselves in classical European culture. Chinese tacos and Irish bagels reflect ethnic cross-over in employment patterns in the American fast-food sector. Asian rap refers to crosscultural stylistic convergence in popular youth culture.

An episode that can serve to probe this more deeply is the influence of Japanese art on European painting. The impact of *Japonisme* is well-known: it inspired impressionism which in turn set the stage for modernism. The colour woodcuts that made such a profound impression on Seurat, Manet, Van Gogh, Toulouse Lautrec, Whistler belonged to the Ukiyo school – a bourgeois genre that flourished in Japan between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, sponsored by the merchant class. Ukiyo-e typically depicted urban scenes of ephemeral character, such as entertainments, theatre or prostitution, and also landscapes. It was as popular art form which, unlike the high art of aristocracy, was readily available at reasonable prices in bookstores (rather than cloistered in courts or monasteries) and therefore also accessible to Europeans (Budde 1993). This episode, then, is not so much an exotic irruption in European culture, but rather reflects the fact that bourgeois sensibilities had found iconographic expression in Japan earlier than in Europe. In other words, Japanese popular art was modern before European art was. Thus, what from one angle appears as hybridity to the point of exoticism, from another angle it again reflects transcultural class affinities in sensibilities vis-à-vis urban life and nature. In other words, the other side of cultural hybridity is transcultural convergence.

What makes it difficult to discuss these issues is that two quite distinct concepts of culture are generally being used indiscriminately. The first concept of culture (culture 1) views culture as essentially territorial; it assumes that culture stems from a learning process that is, in the main, localised. This is culture in the sense of a *culture*, i.e., the culture of a society or social group. A notion that goes back to nineteenth-century romanticism, and one that has been elaborated in twentieth-century anthropology, in particular cultural relativism – with the notion of cultures as a whole, a Gestalt, configuration. A related idea is the organic or ‘tree’ model of culture.
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A wider understanding of culture (culture 2) views culture as a general human 'software' (Banuri 1990 : 77), as in nature/culture arguments. This notion has been implicit in theories of evolution and diffusion, in which culture is viewed as, in the main, a translocal learning process. These understandings are not incompatible: culture 2 finds expression in culture 1, cultures are the vehicle of culture. But they do reflect different emphases in relation to historical processes of cultural relations. Divergent meta-assumptions about culture underlie the varied vocabularies in which cultural relations are discussed.

Assumptions about culture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territorial culture</th>
<th>Translocal culture</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>endogenous</td>
<td>exogenous</td>
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<tr>
<td>orthogenetic</td>
<td>heterogenetic</td>
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<tr>
<td>societies, nations, empires</td>
<td>diasporas, migrations</td>
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<tr>
<td>locales, regions</td>
<td>crossroads, borders, interstices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>community-based</td>
<td>networks, brokers, strangers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organic, unitary</td>
<td>diffusion, heterogeneity</td>
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<tr>
<td>authenticity</td>
<td>translation</td>
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<tr>
<td>inward-looking</td>
<td>outward-looking</td>
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<tr>
<td>community linguistics</td>
<td>contact linguistics⁶</td>
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<tr>
<td>race</td>
<td>half-caste, half-breed, métis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnicity</td>
<td>new identity</td>
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<tr>
<td>identity</td>
<td>identification, new identity</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Culture 2 or translocal culture is not without place (there is no culture without place), but it involves an outward-looking sense of place, whereas culture 1 is inward-looking. Culture 2 involves what Doreen Massey calls 'a global sense of place': 'the specificity of place which derives from the fact that each place is the focus of a distinct mixture of wider and more local social relations' (1993 : 240). The general terminology of cultural pluralism, multicultural society, intercultural relations, and so on, does not clarify whether it refers to culture open (1) or culture closed (2). Thus, relations among cultures can be viewed in a static fashion (in which cultures retain their separateness in interaction) or a fluid fashion (in which cultures interpenetrate).

Cultural relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Static</th>
<th>Fluid</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>plural society (Furnivall)</td>
<td>pluralism, melting pot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>multiculturalism (static)</td>
<td>multiculturalism (fluid), interculturalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global mosaic</td>
<td>cultural flow in space (Hannerz)</td>
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<tr>
<td>clash of civilisations</td>
<td>third cultures</td>
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Hybridisation as a perspective belongs to the fluid end of relations between cultures: it is the mixing of cultures and not their separateness that is emphasised. At the same time, the underlying assumption about culture is that of
culture/place. Cultural forms are called hybrid/syncretic/mixed/creolised because the elements in the mix derive from different cultural contexts. Thus, Ulf Hannerz defines creole cultures as follows: ‘creole cultures like creole languages are those which draw in some way on two or more historical sources, often originally widely different. They have had some time to develop and integrate, and to become elaborate and pervasive’ (1987 : 552). But, in this sense, would not every culture be a creole culture? Can we identify any culture that is not creole in the sense of drawing on one or more different historical sources? A scholar of music makes a similar point about world music: ‘all music is essentially world music’ (Bor 1994 : 2).

A further question is: are cultural elements different merely because they originate from different cultures? More often, what may be at issue, as argued above, is the similarity of cultural elements when viewed from the point of class, status group, life-style sensibilities or function. Hence, at some stage, toward the end of the story, the notion of cultural hybrity itself unravels or, at least, needs reworking. In the words of Kwame Appiah, ‘If there is a lesson in the broad shape of this circulation of cultures, it is surely that we are all already contaminated by each other, that there is no longer a fully autochthonous echt-African culture awaiting salvage by our artists (just as there is, of course, no American culture without African roots)’ (1992 : 155).

To explore what this means in the context of globalisation, we can contrast the vocabularies and connotations of globalisation-as-homogenisation and globalisation-as-hybridisation.

<table>
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<th>Globalisation/homogenisation</th>
<th>Globalisation/diversification</th>
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<tr>
<td>cultural imperialism</td>
<td>cultural planetarisation</td>
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<td>cultural dependence</td>
<td>cultural interdependence</td>
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<tr>
<td>cultural hegemony</td>
<td>cultural interpenetration</td>
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<tr>
<td>autonomy</td>
<td>syncretism, synthesis, hybridity</td>
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<tr>
<td>modernisation</td>
<td>modernisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westernisation</td>
<td>global mélange</td>
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<tr>
<td>cultural synchronisation</td>
<td>creolisation, cross-over</td>
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<tr>
<td>world civilisation</td>
<td>global ecumene</td>
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What is common to some perspectives on both sides of the globalisation/homogenisation/heterogenisation axis is a territorial view of culture. The territoriality of culture, however, itself is not constant over time. For some time we have entered a period of accelerated globalisation and cultural mixing. This also involves an overall tendency towards the ‘deterritorialisation’ of culture, or an overall shift in orientation from culture 1 to culture 2. Introverted cultures, which have been prominent over a long stretch of history and which overshadowed translocal culture, are gradually receding into the background, while trans/local culture made up of diverse elements is coming into the foreground. This transition and the hybridisation processes themselves unleash intense nostalgia politics and mobilisation drives, of which ethnic
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upsurges, ethnicisation of nations, and religious revivalism form part.

Hybridisation refers not only to the criss-crossing of cultures (culture 1) but also, and by the same token, to a transition from the provenance of culture 1 to culture 2. Another aspect of this transition is that due to advancing information technology and bio-technology, different modes of hybridity emerge on the horizon: in the light of hybrid forms such as cyborgs, virtual reality and electronic simulation, intercultural differences may begin to pale to relative insignificance – although of great local intensity. Bio-technology opens up the perspective of ‘merged evolution’, in the sense of the merger of the evolutionary streams of genetics, cultural evolution, and information technology, and the near prospect of humans intervening in genetic evolution, through the matrix of cultural evolution and information technologies (Goonatilake 1994).

Conclusion: a global sociology?

Globalisation/hybridisation makes, first, an empirical case: that processes of globalisation, past and present, can be adequately described as processes of hybridisation. Secondly, it is a critical argument: against viewing globalisation in terms of homogenisation, or of modernisation/Westernisation, as empirically narrow and historically flat.

The career of sociology has been coterminous with the career of nation-state formation and nationalism, and from this followed the constitution of the object of sociology as society and the equation of society with the nation. Culminating in structural functionalism and modernisation theory, this career in the context of globalisation is in for retooling. A global sociology is taking shape, around notions such as social networks (rather than ‘societies’), border zones, boundary crossing and global society. In other words, a sociology conceived within the framework of nations/societies is making place for a post-inter/national sociology of hybrid formations, times and spaces.

Structural hybridisation, or the increase in the range of organisational options, and cultural hybridisation, or the doors of erstwhile imagined communities opening up, are signs of an age of boundary crossing. Not, surely, of the erasure of boundaries. Thus, state power remains extremely strategic, but it is no longer the only game in town. The tide of globalisation reduces states’ room for manoeuvre, while international institutions, transnational transactions, regional cooperation, subnational dynamics and non-governmental organisations expand in impact and scope (Griffin and Khan 1992; Walker 1988).

In historical terms, this perspective may be deepened by writing diaspora histories of global culture. Due to nationalism as the dominant paradigm since the nineteenth century, cultural achievements have been routinely claimed for ‘nations’, i.e., culture has been ‘nationalised’, territorialised. A different historical record can be constructed on the basis of the contributions to culture formation and diffusion by diasporas, migrations, strangers, brokers. A related project would be histories of the hybridisation of metropolitan cultures, i.e., a counter-history to the narrative of imperial history. Such historical enquiries may show that hybridisation has been taking place all along but over time has

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been concealed by religious, national, imperial and civilisational chauvinisms. Moreover, they may deepen our understanding of the temporalities of hybridisation: how certain junctures witness downturns or upswings of hybridisation, slow-downs or speed-ups. At the same time, it follows that, if we accept that cultures have been hybrid all along, hybridisation is in effect a tautology: contemporary accelerated globalisation means the hybridisation of hybrid cultures.

As such, the hybridisation perspective remains meaningful only as a critique of essentialism. Essentialism will remain strategic as a mobilisational device as long as the units of nation, state, region, civilisation, ethnicity remain strategic: and for just as long hybridisation remains a relevant approach. Hybridity unsettles the introverted concept of culture which underlies romantic nationalism, racism, ethnicism, religious revivalism, civilisational chauvinism, and cultural essentialism. Hybridisation, then, is a perspective that is meaningful as a counterweight to the introverted notion of culture; at the same time, the very process of hybridisation unsettles the introverted gaze, and accordingly, hybridisation eventually ushers in post-hybridity, or transcultural cut and mix.

Hybridisation is a factor in the reorganisation of social spaces. Structural hybridisation, or the emergence of new practices of social cooperation and competition, and cultural hybridisation, or new translocal cultural expressions, are interdependent: new forms of cooperation require and evoke new cultural imaginaries. Hybridisation is a contribution to a sociology of the in-between, a sociology from the interstices. This involves merging endogenous/exogenous understandings of culture. This parallels the attempt in international relations theory to overcome the dualism between the nation-state and international system perspectives. Other significant perspectives are Hannerz’s macro-anthropology and his concern with mapping micro–macro linkages (1989), and contemporary work in geography and cultural studies (for example, Bird et al. 1993).

In relation to the global human condition of inequality, the hybridisation perspective releases reflection and engagement from the boundaries of nation, community, ethnicity or class. Fixities have become fragments as the kaleidoscope of collective experience is in motion. It has been in motion all along and the fixities of nation, community, ethnicity and class have been grids superimposed upon experiences more complex and subtle than reflexivity and organisation could accommodate.

Notes

1. An equivalent view in international relations is Morse (1976). After having argued for globalisations in the plural, I shall still continue to use globalisation in the singular in this text because it matches conventional usage, and because there is no need to stress the point in inelegant grammar.

2. The mélange element comes across for instance in the definition of semi-periphery of Chase-Dunn and Hall (1993 : 865–6): ‘(1) a semi-peripheral region may be one that mixes both core and peripheral forms of organisation; (2) a semi-peripheral region may be spatially located between core and peripheral regions; (3) mediating activities between core and peripheral regions may be carried
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out in semi-peripheral regions; (4) a semi-peripheral area may be one in which institutional features are in some ways intermediate between those forms in core and periphery’. Interestingly, Chase-Dunn and Hall also destabilise the notions of core and periphery, pointing, for instance, to situations ‘in which the “periphery” systematically exploits the “core”’ (ibid.: 864). I am indebted to an anonymous International Sociology reviewer for alerting me to this source and to the relevance of semi-periphery in this context.

3. Elsewhere I have argued this case extensively (Nederveen Pieterse 1994; also 1990: Ch. 15).

4. As against peninsulares, born in the Iberian peninsula, indígenas, or native Americans, and ladinos and chichas, straddled between those of European and native American descent.

5. In Pour Rushdie, a collection of essays by Arab and Islamic intellectuals in support of freedom of expression, Paris is referred to as a capitale Arabe. This evokes another notion of hybridity; one that claims a collective ground and is based on multiple subjectivities in the name of a universal value.


7. Several of the ‘primitive isolates’, the traditional objects of study in anthropology, may be possible exceptions, although even this may be questioned in the context of the long stretch of time.

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Biographical Note: Jan Nederveen Pieterse is at the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague. His latest books include White on Black: Images of Africa and Blacks in Western Popular Culture (1992), and edited collections Emancipations, Modern and Postmodern (1992), and Christianity and Hegemony (1992). His present research interests include globalisation and democratisation, the normalisation of cultural pluralism and alternative futures.

Address: Institute of Social Studies, P.O. Box 29776, 2502 LT Den Haag, The Netherlands.